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This paper introduces and characterizes the number-sensitive critical-level generalized-
utilitarian family of population principles which is a generalization of the critical-level
generalized-utilitarian family. number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian principles rank al-
ternatives by using a value function that is equal to total utility minus a sum of critical
levels that may depend on population size but not on individual utilities, and number-
sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles use transformed utilities and crit-
ical levels. Ethical properties of the principles are investigated and the new family is
compared to number-dampened generalized utilitarianism whose value functions are equal
to transformed representative utility (average utility in the utilitarian case) multiplied by
a function of population size.
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This paper introduces a new family of population principles and compares it to one sug-
gested by Ng [1986]. Both families have same-number principles that are generalized
utilitarian, using transformed utilities to rank alternatives. If the transform is concave
(strictly concave), the principle exhibits weak (strong) aversion to inequality in utilities,
and utilitarianism is a special case.
Because attempts to apply population principles to single periods lead to great di-
culties, the utility levels that we employ are indexes of lifetime well-being.1 In addition,
because the principles we investigate are `welfarist' (Sen [1974, 1977]), using only infor-
mation about individual well-being to rank alternatives, it is important that utility levels
reﬂect a comprehensive account of well-being such as that of Grin [1986] or Sumner
[1996]. Following standard practice, we normalize utilities so that a lifetime utility level
of zero represents neutrality: above neutrality, a life, as a whole, is worth living; below
neutrality, it is not. We reject the view that a person can gain or lose by being brought
into existence.2
The number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian family has critical levels
which may depend on population size but not on utility levels. An important subfamily is
comprised of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles (Blackorby and Donaldson
[1984]) with critical levels that are the same for all population sizes.3 To understand the
idea of a critical level of utility, compare two alternatives in which the second has one
additional person and the utility levels of the common population are the same in both. If
the utility level of the added person is the critical level for the rst alternative, the two are
ranked as equally good. Critical levels for the classical generalized-utilitarian principles
(and for classical utilitarianism) are zero and critical levels for average utilitarianism are
average utility.
The value functions for principles in the number-dampened utilitarian family (Ng
[1986]) are equal to average utility multiplied by a function of population size. If the func-
tion is any positive multiple of population size, the principle is classical utilitarianism and,
if the function is a positive constant, it is average utilitarianism. In addition, critical levels
for the number-dampened utilitarian principles are equal to average utility multiplied by
a function of population size. A subfamily results from making that function independent
of population size; such a principle might have critical levels that are equal to one-half
average utility. The number-dampened utilitarian family can be extended so that it is
consistent with same-number generalized utilitarianism.
1 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1997a,b].
2 For discussions, see Broome [1993], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1997c], Heyd [1992] and Part
[1984].
3 See also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995].
1If a population principle has some negative critical levels, then some additions of per-
sons whose lives are not worth living to utility-unaected populations are ranked as social
improvements. It is desirable, therefore, to use principles that do not have negative criti-
cal levels. In addition, it is sensible to employ principles that do not imply the repugnant
conclusion (Part [1976, 1982, 1984]). Such principles rank any alternative in which each
person experiences a positive lifetime utility level, no matter how great, as worse than
some large-population alternative in which individual lives are barely worth living.
In Section 2, we dene the principles that we investigate and explore a few of their
properties. Then, in Section 3, we turn to independence axioms that restrict the infor-
mation needed to rank alternatives. Each requires rankings of pairs of alternatives to be
independent of the utility levels and/or existence of individuals whose levels of well-being
are the same in both. This would occur, for example, in ranking alternatives that are fea-
sible in the present: the utility levels of Cleopatra and Socrates are the same in them all.
Using the dierent axioms, we present theorems that characterize both number-sensitive
critical-level generalized utilitarianism and number-dampened generalized utilitarianism.
Sections 4 and 5 investigate ethical properties of the two families. In addition to
the requirements that principles have nonnegative critical levels and avoid the repugnant
conclusion, several other requirements on critical levels and the behaviour of best choices
from feasible sets of alternatives are considered.
Section 6 concludes the main part of the paper and it compares the two families. We
argue that the number-sensitive critical-level principles with nonnegative, nondecreasing
critical levels, at least one of which is positive, are superior to all of the number-dampened
principles. The critical-level principles with positive critical levels are part of the ethically
acceptable family, and we argue that there are good reasons for choosing one of them.
Section 7 is an Appendix which contains all formal denitions and proofs of theorems.
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to principles that order alternatives com-
pletely and we do not consider derived rankings of acts that have uncertain consequences.
For principles that provide incomplete (but transitive) rankings, see Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [1996] and, for extensions to uncertainty, see Broome [1991] and Blacko-
rby, Bossert and Donaldson [1998, 2000]. Although we do not consider the possibility of
discounting the utilities of members of future generations in this paper, it is investigated
in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1997b,c].
2. Welfarist Population Principles
Suppose that X is a set of social alternatives that are complete descriptions of the world
from distant past to remote future. In each alternative, there is a set of people who are
alive at some time. X may or may not contain the null alternative, the one in which no one
2is alive. Welfarist population principles use information about the levels of lifetime well-
being (utility) of those alive to rank alternatives according to their goodness. Principles
that rank alternatives in this `timeless' way avoid the diculties that arise when they
are applied to a single period or to the present and future only (see Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [1997a,b]). We employ the standard convention that a utility level of zero
represents neutrality: a life, as a whole, is worth living if and only if lifetime well-being is
positive.
Welfarist population principles that order alternatives completely and transitively
and satisfy same-number anonymity (alternatives with the same number of people alive
and the same utility levels are equally good) can be represented by a single ordering4 of
utility vectors of varying dimension: alternative x is ranked as no worse than alternative
y if and only if the vector of utility levels in x is ranked as no worse than the vector of
utilities in y b yt h es i n g l eo r d e r i n g . 5 Consequently, investigations of welfarist population
principles can focus on the ordering of vectors of utility levels.
We work, in this paper, with principles whose same-number subprinciples are anony-
mous and order vectors of individual utility levels continuously, which ensures that big
changes in rankings do not result from trivially small changes in utilities. In addition, we
require principles to satisfy the strong Pareto principle.
For any alternative with a positive population, these axioms guarantee the existence
of a utility level that we call representative utility. It is that level which, if assigned to
each person, is associated with an alternative that is as good as the original one. Given
this, it can be shown that any population principle has a value function for alternatives
other than the null that can be written in terms of population size and representative
utility (Blackorby and Donaldson [1984], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]) and
is increasing in representative utility. See the end of this section for a way to extend the
value function to cover the null alternative.6
For any alternative x, we write nx as population size and, for alternatives other than
the null, x as representative utility. x is better than y if and only if the value function
yields a greater number for x than for y. In addition, x and y are equally good if and only
if the two values are the same. This can be summarized by the single statement that, for
all x and y in X, x is at least as good as y if and only if
W(nx; x)W(n y; y)( 1 )
4 An ordering is a no-worse-than relation that is reﬂexive, complete and transitive.
5 See Blackorby and Donaldson [1984] or Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000].
6 This provides a test for any principle that provides complete rankings of alternatives: if it cannot be
represented by a value function that can be written in terms of population size and representative utility,
it does not rank alternatives transitively.
3where W is the value function. If either x or y is the null alternative, the appropriate term
in (1) is replaced with its value. In the rest of the paper, value functions are explicitly
written out for positive populations only.
If a principle's same-number subprinciples are utilitarian, representative utility is
average utility, which we write as
 =
1
n
n X
i=1
ui (2)
and, in this case, value functions can be written as W(n;).
The value function for a principle is not unique: any increasing transform, such as
the one that results from multiplying by two, represents the same principle. In addition,
value functions can be written in other ways. If a principle is consistent with same-number
utilitarianism, for example, the value function may be written as a function of population
size and total utility because average utility is equal to total utility divided by population
size. A value function of this type is given by
~ W(n;)=W( n;=n)=W( n;)( 3 )
where  =
Pn
i=1ui is total utility. Alternatively, because population size is equal to total
utility divided by average utility, the function W may be replaced by the value function
^ W,w i t h
^ W( ;)=W( =;): (4)
Although such a value function, which depends on total utility and average utility, is
(implicitly) used by Part [1984], it is much easier to work with functions that depend
on population size and average (or total) utility. The reason is that population size is
an integer and average utility is a real number. If the average-total formulation of (4) is
employed, the function is dened only at total-average combinations in which total utility
is an integer multiple of average utility. For that reason, we have chosen to work with the
population-size { representative-utility representations.
The value function for average utilitarianism (AU) is average utility, so
WAU(n;)==
1
n
n X
i =1
ui: (5)
`Isovalue' lines for average utilitarian principles are displayed in Figure 1. Each bulleted
point represents an average-utility { population-size pair, and the dotted isovalue lines
join points of equal value which are ranked as equally good by average utilitarianism.
The lines have a population of one as a base. In each, a single person has a particular
utility level: sixty, thirty, zero and minus thirty for lines I, II, III and IV respectively.
Consequently, points on line I are better than points on line II, with points on lines III
and IV successively worse. The lines are ﬂat because the value function is independent
4of population size; any two points with the same average utility are equally good. This
means that AU ranks alternatives in a peculiar way: an alternative with any population
size in which each person has the same utility level is ranked as worse than an alternative
in which one person has an arbitrarily higher utility level.
In a similar way, the value function for classical utilitarianism (CU) can be written
in terms of population size and average utility. It is
WCU
 
n;

= n =
n X
i=1
ui; (6)
the product of population size and average utility which is equal to the sum of utilities. It
is illustrated in Figure 2. The four lines again join points ranked as equally good and are
based on average utilities of sixty, thirty, zero and minus thirty for a population size of
one. When average utility is positive (above neutrality), increases in population size with
average utility constant are good and, when average utility is negative (below neutrality),
increases in population size that do not change average utility are bad.
A principle leads to the repugnant conclusion (Part [1976, 1982, 1984]) if and only if
every alternative in which each person experiences a positive utility level, no matter how
great, is declared to be worse than an alternative in which each member of a suciently
large population has a utility level that is above neutrality but arbitrarily close to it.
Such principles may recommend the creation of a large population in which each person is
poverty stricken. As Heyd [1992, p. 57] remarks, `What is the good of a world swarming
with people having lives barely worth living, even if overall the aggregation of the \utility"
of its members supersedes that of any alternative, smaller world?' Classical utilitarianism
is a principle that implies the repugnant conclusion and many people reject it for that
reason.
Although average utilitarianism does not imply the repugnant conclusion, it recom-
mends the addition of individuals to a utility-unaected population whenever the utilities
of the added individuals are above the average utility of the existing population. Thus,
when average utility is negative, some additions of people whose lives are not worth living
are regarded as good.
This observation can be made more explicit by using critical levels of utility. For any
population principle, compare an alternative to another with one added person in which
utility levels for the original population are the same. If the two alternatives are equally
good, the utility level of the added person is the critical level of utility for the alternative.
Given same-number utilitarianism, critical levels (if they exist) depend on population size
5and the average-utility level of the existing population (but they may be independent of
either).7
For average utilitarianism, critical levels are equal to average utility. Consequently,
critical levels for alternatives in which average utility is negative are themselves nega-
tive. For such an alternative, therefore, the addition of a person with a negative but
above-average utility is ranked as an improvement. It seems reasonable to reject average
utilitarianism because of this, and to require all critical levels to be non-negative.
For classical utilitarianism, all critical levels are equal to zero, the utility level that
represents neutrality. It can be shown that, if all critical levels are zero or negative,
any principle that is weakly averse to inequality in utilities must satisfy the repugnant
conclusion.8 Consequently, if the repugnant conclusion is regarded as ethically undesirable,
some critical levels must be positive.
Critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) is a family of principles, one for each value of a
xed utility level which is the critical level for every alternative. CLU's value functions
are given by
WCLU(n;)=n
 
−

=
n X
i =1
 
ui − )( 7 )
where  is the critical level for the particular principle represented by the function. The
value function can be calculated by subtracting the critical level from average utility and
multiplying the resulting number by population size, or by subtracting the critical level
from the utility of each person alive and summing. If the critical level is zero, classical
utilitarianism results and, therefore, CU is a member of the the CLU family.
Isovalue lines for CLU with a critical level of thirty are illustrated in Figure 3. If
average utility is held constant, population expansions are good if it is above thirty, neither
good nor bad if it is equal to thirty, and bad if average utility is below thirty. In the
general case, for any alternative in which average utility is above the critical level, there is
no alternative with a larger population and an average utility below the critical level that
is better. Consequently, the repugnant conclusion is not implied as long as the critical
level is positive. The critical level can be interpreted as providing a ﬂoor on the trade-o
between average utility and numbers.
Population principles with positive critical levels give weight to individual lives. Con-
sider alternative x in which population size is n  2a n dl e tyand z be alternatives with
one additional person. Lifetime utility levels for all but one person (the rst n−1 people)
7 If n is population size,  is average utility and c is the critical level, then the average utility of the
larger population is (n+c)=(n+1). Consequently, W(n;)=W( n+1;(n+c)=(n+1))andcdepends
on n and . In general, if the same-number subprinciples are generalized utilitarian and critical levels
exist, they can be written in terms of population size and representative utility.
8 See Arrhenius [1997], Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson
[1991], Carlson [1998], McMahan [1981], Ng [1989] and Part [1976, 1982, 1984].
6are the same in all three alternatives and utility levels for the the remaining two people
are given in Table 1. c is the critical level for alternative x.
person alternative x alternative y alternative z
1:::n−1 same in all three
n 100 100 50
n +1 − c 50
Table 1
In z, the utility levels in the table might arise because person the nthperson and the
additional person live half as long in z as person n did in x. Because the critical level for
x is c, x and y are equally good. Therefore, by transitivity, x is better than z if and only
if y is better than z. Same-number utilitarianism ranks y and z as equally good if and
only if 100 + c = 50 + 50 or c =0 ,a n dxas better than y if and only if 100 + c>100
or c>0. Consequently, alternative x, with the smaller number number of people and the
same total utility, is ranked as better than z if and only if its critical level is positive.
It follows that members of the critical-level utilitarian family with positive critical
levels give weight to individual lives in addition to avoiding the repugnant conclusion.
Although average utilitarianismdoes the latter, it does not always giveweight to individual
lives. Suppose that, in Table 1, average utility in x is negative (if n were 2, this would
result from a utility level of −200 for person one). Then, because the critical level c is
negative, the above argument shows that AU ranks z as better than x:t w op e o p l ew i t h
utility levels of 50 each are better, other things equal, to one person with a utility level of
100.
This paper introduces a new family of principles which includes the CLU family. It
is the number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian (NCLU) family and its critical levels are
independent of average utility but not necessarily independent of population size. We
write the critical level for population size n>0a sc n .F o rn=0 ,c 0is the critical level
for the null alternative if it is in X, and an arbitrary real number if it is not (the number
chosen makes no dierence to rankings in this case). The value functions for the NCLU
principles can be written, for positive population sizes, as
WNCLU(n;)=n
 
− A ( n )

=
n X
i =1
 
ui − ci−1

(8)
7where
 A(n)=
1
n
n − 1 X
i =0
ci: (9)
 A(n) is the average of the critical levels for population sizes 0 to n − 1. These value
functions can be computed by subtracting the average of the critical levels for population
sizes zero to n−1 from average utility and multiplying by population size or, equivalently,
by subtracting, in turn, the critical levels for population sizes zero to n−1 from the utilities
of those alive and adding. Alternatively CLU results from making all the critical levels
equal to the same real number, so that  A(n)i se q u a lt o , the xed critical level. The
value functions for members of the NCLU family can also be written as
WNCLU(n;)=n − A(n) (10)
where
A(n)=
n X
i =1
ci−1: (11)
Number-sensitive critical-level utilitarianism is illustrated in Figure 4. In that exam-
ple, critical levels are zero for population size one and thirty for all population sizes greater
than one. The positive critical levels for higher population sizes ensure that the repugnant
conclusion is avoided. If average utility is constant, population expansion is good when
it is above thirty, bad when it is negative. And, if average utility is nonnegative and no
greater than thirty, expansion may be good, bad or indierent depending on how big the
existing population is. In our example, NCLU coincides with CU for population sizes one
and two and, as population size becomes very large, it approximates CLU with a critical
level of thirty.
Reasonable conditions for ethical acceptability of members of the NCLU family are
that all critical levels be nonnegative and that the repugnant conclusion not be implied.
These requirements, together with several others, are discussed in Section 4.
Another family of principles is a generalization of average utilitarianism and of clas-
sical utilitarianism. It is the number-dampened utilitarian (NDU) family (Ng [1986]). Its
value functions can be written as
WNDU(n;)=f( n ) =
f( n )
n
n X
i =1
ui; (12)
where f is a positive-valued function of population size. If f(n)=nor any multiple, CU
results and, if f(n) is independent of n, AU results. Both Ng and Hurka [1983] suggested
that principles ought to approximate CU for `small' population sizes and AU for `large'
sizes. Figure 5 illustrates such a case with f(1) = 1, f(2) = 2, f(3) = 2:6, and f(n)=3
for all n  3. For population sizes one and two, the principle coincides with CU and, for
8population sizes of four or more, it coincides with AU. It can be shown (see Section 5) that
critical levels for NDU are equal to a multiple of average utility. The multiple can depend
on population size. Consequently the critical level for population size n can be written as
h(n) where h is a function of n. In our example, h(n) is equal to zero for n =1 ,: 31 for
n =2 ,: 47 for n =3 ,a n d1f o rn= 4 and greater.
An important special case, specializes NDU in a way that is parallel to the way that
constant critical levels specialize NCLU to CLU. It requires h(n), the ratio of critical levels
to average utilities, to be a constant between zero and one. Conditions on the functions
f and h that ensure that the repugnant conclusion is avoided and that critical levels are
nonnegative are explored in Section 5.
Utilitarian principles are indierent to utility inequality: for a xed population, all
distributions of the same total utility are ranked as equally good. Many xed-population
welfarist principles exhibit inequality aversion, however, and can be employed as part of
population principles.
Generalized-utilitarian (GU) principles are same-number principles that use the sum
of transformed utilities, instead of the sum of utility levels themselves, to rank alterna-
tives. The transforms g must be continuous and increasing and, if concave, endow the
principle with inequality aversion. Same-number utilitarianism is same-number general-
ized utilitarianism with g(t)=tfor all t.I n t h i s c a s e , g is concave but not strictly so
and utilitarianism's inequality aversion is weak. If g is strictly concave, same-number GU
exhibits strict inequality aversion: any unambiguous reduction in utility inequality accord-
ing to the Lorenz criterion (same total with Lorenz curves that do not cross) is ranked as
a social improvement. Without loss of generality, we normalize the transform so that the
transformed value of a utility level of zero is zero. One simple example is a transform that
gives a higher weight to negative than to positive utilities.
The value functions for all of the generalized-utilitarian principles are the same as
those for the utilitarian principles with transformed utilities, representative utilities and
critical levels replacing their untransformed counterparts. Representative utilities for prin-
ciples that are consistent with same-number generalized utilitarianism satisfy
g()=
1
n
n X
i =1
g(ui): (13)
Transformed representative utility is the average of individual transformed utilities.
Average generalized-utilitarian (AGU) principles have value functions that can be
written as
WAGU(n;)=g (  )=
1
n
n X
i =1
g(ui): (14)
9The value function is transformed representative utility, which is equal to average trans-
formed utility.
The value functions for classical generalized utilitarianism (CGU) can similarly be
written as
WCGU(n;)=ng()=
n X
i =1
g(ui); (15)
which is the sum of transformed utilities.
Members of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian (CLGU) family have value func-
tions that are equal to the dierence between transformed representative utility and the
transformed critical level multiplied by population size or, equivalently, to the sum of
the dierences between individual transformed utilities and the critical level. The value
functions can be written as
WCLGU(n;)=n
 
g (  )−g (  )

=
n X
i =1
 
g(ui) − g()

: (16)
Valuefunctions for membersof thenumber-sensitivecritical-levelgeneralized-utilitarian
(NCLGU) family can be written as
WNCLGU(n;)=n

g (  )−g
  A g( n )
 
=
n X
i =1
 
g(ui) − g(ci−1)

(17)
where
g
   Ag(n)

=
1
n
n−1 X
i=0
g(ci): (18)
As in the denition of NCLU, c0;:::;c n−1 are critical levels for population sizes zero to
n − 1w i t hc 0set arbitrarily if the null alternative is not in X. The term  Ag(n)i st h e
representative utility for the vector of critical levels (c0;:::;c n−1)a n dg
  A g ( n )

is the
average of the transformed critical levels for population sizes zero to n − 1. The value
function for NCLGU can also be written as
WCLGU(n;)=ng() − Ag(n); (19)
where
Ag(n)=
n X
i =1
g(ci−1): (20)
The value functions for members of the number-dampened generalized-utilitarian
(NDGU) family can be written as
WNDGU(n;)=f( n ) g (  )=
f ( n )
n
n X
i =1
g(ui) (21)
10where f(n) is positive for all n>0. If f(n) is equal to any positive constant, the value
function represents average generalized utilitarianism and, if f(n)i se q u a lt onor any
positive multiple, the value function represents classical generalized utilitarianism.
Critical levelsfor NDGU are such that their transformed values are equal to a function
h of population size multiplied by transformed representative utility. A special case results
when h(n) is a constant: see Section 5 for this result and other explorations.
If the null alternative is in X, it is possible to extend the value function for any
principle to cover it as long as it has a critical level. Writing c; as the null critical level,
the null alternative and one in which a single person experiences a utility level of c;
are equally good. Consequently, we may dene the value for the null alternative to be
w; = W(1;c ;). The extensions of the value functions presented above are zero for CGU,
CLGU (assuming that c; = )a n dN C L G U( w i t hc ;=c 0 ). For AGU, w; = g(c;) and,
for NDGU, w; = f(1)g(c;). It follows that w; is zero for CU, CLU and NCLU, c; for AU
and f(1)c; for NDU.
3. Independence Axioms
In general, population principles require a great deal of information. The population in
question consists of all those who ever have and ever will live, and their utility levels
must be known in addition to population size. Because principles rank alternatives that
correspond to complete histories of the world from the remote past to distant future, it is
possible that the ranking of changes that aect only those presently alive will be dierent
depending of the existence and/or utility levels of people who are long dead or who will
not be born for many centuries. The axioms we introduce in this section have the eect of
reducing the information required to make social judgements and, in addition, guarantee
the existence of population principles that can be applied to the individuals aected by
social changes. In each case, attention is restricted to positive population sizes.
The weakest of the three axioms that we investigate is called independence of the
utilities of unconcerned individuals (IUUI) and it applies to comparisons in which the same
people are alive. Suppose that the utility levels of the members of a population subgroup
are the same in two alternatives. Members of the subgroup are called `unconcerned', and
this axiom requires that the social ordering of the alternatives must be independent of their
utility levels. In conjunction with our basic axioms (welfarism, anonymity, strong Pareto
and continuity), this axiom implies that all same-number rankings must be generalized
utilitarian (Theorem 1). The transforms used may be dierent for dierent population
sizes, however.
IUUI ensures that, in xed-number comparisons, information about the utility levels
of the unconcerned individuals need not be known but, if the transforms are dierent for
11dierent population sizes, their number is needed. A consequence of this is that there are
well-dened principles for groups such as the population of Canada that can be applied
to xed-number changes that aect subgroup members only. The axiom does not imply
that the xed-number principles for Canada are independent of total population size,
which is the number of people who ever live. For that, stronger axioms such as the
population substitution principle (Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]) are needed. It requires
that any utility vector and a second vector in which each member of a subgroup receives
the subgroup's representative utility are ranked as equally good.
A stronger axiom requires the ranking of utility vectors to be independent of both the
utility levels and existence of unconcerned individuals. Suppose that, in any two utility
vectors, there is a subgroup of unconcerned individuals. Extended independence of the
utilities of unconcerned individuals (EIUUI) requires the ranking to be the same as the
one that would be made if they did not exist. Thus, in this case, well-dened population
principles exist for all groups such as nations. If a change aects the number and utility
levels of present-day Canadians only, the overall population principle can safely be applied
to them alone. Information about the utilities and numbers of others is not needed.
Extended independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals implies the weaker
axiom IUUI. If we add the requirement that there is at least one alternative for which a
critical level of utility exists (weak expansion equivalence), then it, in conjunction with
our basic axioms and EIUUI, implies that the population principles must be critical-level
generalized utilitarian (Theorem 2).
It is possible to nd an axiom that is weaker than EIUUI but stronger than IUUI.
We call it intermediate independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals (IIUUI).
Suppose that, for any two alternatives with possibly dierent population sizes, there is
a population subgroup, common to both, whose members have the same utility levels in
both. IIUUI requires the ranking of the two alternatives to be independent of the utilities
of the members of the subgroup, who are the unconcerned individuals.
IIUUI is implied by EIUUI and it implies IUUI. It has interesting consequences for
population principles. If, for each population size, a critical level exists for at least one
alternative (intermediate expansion equivalence), then IIUUI in conjunction with our ba-
sic axioms implies that the population principles must be number-sensitive critical-level
generalized utilitarian (Theorem 3).
All of these axioms imply that the same-number subprinciples of any population prin-
ciples are generalized utilitarian, but none of them implies that they must be utilitarian.
For that, other axioms are needed. One possibility is an axiom that we have called incre-
mental equity (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2000]). It is a xed-population axiom
that requires the eect of an addition to one individual's utility to be independent of the
identity and the initial utility of this individual.
124. Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism
In thissection weinvestigatethe properties of the number-sensitivecritical-levelgeneralized-
utilitarian (NCLGU) principles. Because the number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian
principles are members of the larger family, all of our theorems apply to them.
Value functions for the NCLGU principles can be written as in (17) and (18) or,
equivalently, as
WNCLGU(n;)=ng() − Ag(n)=
n X
i =1
g(ui) −
n X
i=1
g(ci−1) (22)
where
Ag(n)=ng
   Ag(n)

=
n−1 X
i=0
g(ci): (23)
The rst requirement we investigate is that critical levels be nonnegative. This is the
case if and only if g(cn)  0 for all n because g is increasing and g(0) = 0. For all n,w e
can write
g(cn)=A g( n+1 )−A g( n )0 ; (24)
and this means that Ag(n) is nondecreasing in n (Theorem 4).
In addition to nonnegative critical levels, it is reasonable to require them not to
decrease as population size increases. Theorem 5 shows that this is the case if and only if
the function Ag is convex, with
Ag(n +1 )
1
2

A g( n )+A g( n+2 )

(25)
for all positive n.
Next, we turn to the repugnant conclusion. Theorem 6 shows that an NCLGU prin-
ciple implies the repugnant conclusion if and only if there is a sequence of population
sizes and corresponding critical levels with a fairly complex property. It must be the case
that the critical levels must fall below any positive number when population size is large
enough. This result can be combined with the result of Theorem 4 to show that, if critical
levels are nonnegative, the repugnant conclusion is implied if and only if critical levels
in the sequence approach zero as population size becomes large (Theorem 7). If critical
levels are nondecreasing, the repugnant conclusion is implied if and only if all critical levels
are nonpositive (Theorem 8). Consequently, a principle with nondecreasing critical levels
avoids the repugnant conclusion if and only if it has one positive critical level. Nondecreas-
ingness of critical levels ensures that, in this case, all critical levels for higher population
sizes are also positive.
Suppose now that a member of the NCLGU family is used to choose the best alterna-
tive or alternatives in some feasible set. We investigate the consequences of increasing any
13one of the critical levels (which means that the new best alternative(s) are chosen with a
dierent principle). Theorem 9 shows that, if any of the best alternatives are dierent in
the two cases, a lower optimal population size corresponds to the higher critical level.
The investigations discussed here suggest that ethically acceptable members of the
number-sensitive critical-level generalized utilitarian family should have critical levels that
are nonnegative and nondecreasing, with at least one that is positive. This means that
there is some population size beyond which critical levels are all positive. This can be
ensured by choosing a function Ag which is nonnegative, positive beyond some population
size, nondecreasing and convex. The same desiderata apply to members of the NCLU
family and the function A. Members of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian family
with positive critical levels satisfy all of the above requirements.
5. Number-Dampened Generalized Utilitarianism
Members of the number-dampened generalized-utilitarian(NDGU) family have value func-
tions that are given by (21) and, when the same-number principles are utilitarian, number-
dampened utilitarianism (NDU) results and the value functions can be written as in (12).
In both, f(n) must be positive so that the value function is increasing in representative
utility (which is average utility in the utilitarian case). Note that the function f is dened
on the set of positive integers.
Suppose that (u1;:::;u n) is the utility vector for an alternative with population size
n and that c is its critical level. Then, using NDU and the denition of critical levels,
f(n) = f(n +1 )
n + c
n +1
: (26)
Rearranging and solving for c,
c =
(n +1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
=h ( n ) ; (27)
where the function h is dened by
h(n)=
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
: (28)
Critical levels for NDU are equal to a function of population size multiplied by average
utility. In the general case (NDGU),
g(c)=
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
g( )=h ( n ) g (  ) ; (29)
and transformed critical levels are equal to a function h of population size multiplied by
the transformed representative utility (see the Appendix).
14Theorem 10 shows that a principle belongs to the NDGU family if and only if its
transformed critical levels are equal to a function of population size multiplied by trans-
formed representative utilities, where h(n) > −n for all n. Note that it is possible for h(n)
to be negative, in which case critical levels for alternatives with positive representative
utilities are negative.
For NDU, critical levels for alternatives with positive population sizes are equal to
h(n). Because  can be positive or negative, some critical levels are negative unless h(n)
is equal to zero for all n. Theorem 11 shows that this applies to NDGU as well and that all
critical levels are nonnegative if and only if the principle is classical generalized utilitarian.
Consequently, the NDGU (NDU) principles that are not classical generalized utilitarian
(classical utilitarian) share the defects of AU and AGU: some critical levels are negative
and, in some cases, the fragmentation of individual lives is regarded as good.
Theorem 12 examines the conditions under which f(n) is increasing in population
size. It shows that f(n) is increasing if and only if h(n)i sl e s st h a no n ef o ra l ln .
Theorem 13 investigates the conditions under which h(n) is nonnegative for all n.
This means that, for NDU, critical levels for alternatives with positive average utilities
sizes are nonnegative and critical levels for alternatives with negative /average utilities
are nonpositive. The theorem shows that h(n) is nonnegative if and only if f(n)=n is
nonincreasing. This condition implies that f is concave but the reverse implication is not
true.
It might be thought undesirable to have h(n) decrease as n rises. It could, for example,
be zero for small n so that the principle coincides with CGU (or CU) for those population
sizes, and approach one for large n, so that the principle approximates AGU (AU) for large
population sizes. Theorem 14 shows that this requirement on h is satised if and only if
(n +2 ) f( n+1 ) f( n+1 )−f( n+1 ) f( n+2 )−( n+1 ) f( n ) f( n+2 )0 (30)
for all values of n. This requirement on f has no transparent interpretation.
Theorem 15 examines the relationship between NDGU and the repugnant conclusion.
It shows that an NDGU principle satises the repugnant conclusion if and only if f(n)i s
unbounded. That is, for any number, no matter how large, there must be a population size
such that f(n) is greater. This is easily illustrated for NDU. Consider any alternative in
which each person's utility level is >0. For any utility level ">0, no matter how small,
there is a better alternative in which a larger population of m individuals experience each
experience utility level " if and only if
f(m)">f( n )  (31)
or, equivalently,
f(m) >f( n )

"
: (32)
15By choosing  and/or ", the right side of (31) can take on any positive value. Consequently
it must be possible to nd a population size m such that f(m) can exceed any value. It
follows that, in order to avoid the repugnant conclusion, f must be bounded: that is, f(n)
must be less than some nite number for all population sizes.
To summarize, a number-dampened generalized-utilitarian principle cannot avoid
having negative critical levels unless they are all zero and it is classical, in which case
it implies the repugnant conclusion. If it avoids the repugnant conclusion, the function f
is bounded and, in that case, some critical levels are negative. h(n), the ratio of critical
levels to transformed representative utility, is less than or equal to one if and only if f(n)
is nondecreasing, nonnegative if and only if f(n)=n is nonincreasing, and nondecreasing if
and only if (30) is satised for all n.
A special case of NDGU arises when h(n) is a positive fraction γ between zero and
one. In this case, we write f(n)=f γ( n ) and it follows that fγ(1) = 1 and, for all n  2,
fγ(n)=

2
1+γ

:::

n
n−1+γ

: (33)
This subfamily of principles satises all of our requirements except, perhaps, the most
important one. As proved in Theorem 16, each member of the family impliesthe repugnant
conclusion. Theorem 17 considers choice problems using these principles and investigates
the response of best population sizes to increases in γ. It shows that, if a higher value
of γ changes the set of best population sizes, any population size must be smaller for the
higher value of γ.
6. Concluding Remarks
The families of population principles that we have investigated are very large. Both the
number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian and number-dampened generalized-
utilitarian families include the classical generalized-utilitarian subfamily and, thus, classi-
cal utilitarianism itself. But most members of the two families have very dierent ethical
properties.
We believe that ethically attractive principles should have at least two fundamental
properties. First, they should avoid the repugnant conclusion and, second, their critical
levels should all be nonnegative. In addition, it is reasonable to select NCLGU princi-
ples whose critical levels do not decrease. Given this, the repugnant conclusion is avoided
if at least one critical level is positive (nondecreasingness ensures that all critical levels
for larger population sizes are positive as well). These properties are satised by any
NCLGU member such that the function Ag is nondecreasing and convex and the dier-
ence Ag(n +1 )−A g( n ) is positive for at least one n. All members of the critical-level
16generalized-utilitarian family with positive critical levels have these properties but they
are not the only NCLGU principles that do.
Consider, however, an NCLGU or NCLU principle whose critical levels are not con-
stant. One level might be chosen for `small' population sizes with a higher one for `large'
sizes. The foremost diculty with such a principle is the denition of `small' and `large'.
Principles must be capable of ranking states of aairs that correspond to complete histo-
ries of the universe without incorporating resource constraints such as carrying capacity.
Reasonable denitions of `small' and `large' are almost certain to refer to resource avail-
ability and, if they do that, build the constraints of nature and human history into the
axiology represented by the principle. For that reason, we think that it is reasonable
to require all critical levels to be the same by choosing a member of the critical-level
generalized-utilitarian family with a positive critical level.
NCLGU principles satisfy intermediate independence of the utilities of unconcerned
individuals but not extended independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals. In
ranking alternatives, therefore, absolute population sizes must be known in order to use a
member of the NCLGU family with more than one critical level. This requires knowledge
of the number of people who will ever live, a fact that is almost impossible to ascertain. If
a CLGU principle is employed, however, neither the utilities nor the number of unaected
individuals must be known in order to rank pairs of alternatives. For this reason, CLGU
principles have a signicant advantage over other NCLGU principles.
The number-dampenedgeneralized-utilitarianfamilyhas both theclassical generalized-
utilitarian and average generalized-utilitarian principles as subfamilies. When the same-
number principles are utilitarian, critical levels are proportional to average utility, and the
proportion may depend on population size. When the same-number principles are general-
ized utilitarian, transformed critical levels are proportional to transformed representative
utility. We have shown, however, that there are no membersof the NDGU family with non-
negative critical levels that avoid the repugnant conclusion. If some negative critical levels
are accepted, however, there are additional problems. If our argument about the diculty
of dening `small' and `large' is persuasive, it is reasonable to require h(n)( w h i c hi st h e
ratio of transformed critical levels to transformed representative utility) to be a positive
fraction. We have shown, however, that no such principle avoids the repugnant conclusion.
We conclude, therefore, that all members of the number-dampened generalized-utilitarian
family of population principles are unsatisfactory.
Some number-sensitive critical-level principles with more than one critical level pass
our formal tests. However, informational considerations suggest that extended indepen-
dence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals should be satised, and this restricts
the set of acceptable principles to the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with
positive critical levels.
177. Appendix: Axioms, Theorems, and Proofs
7.1. Notation and Basic Axioms
The set of all (nonnegative, positive) real numbers is denoted by R (R+, R++), and
Z+ (Z++) is the set of all nonnegative (positive) integers. 1n is the vector consisting of
n 2Z ++ ones. For any nonempty set S and any n 2Z ++, Sn is the n-fold Cartesian
product of S. A function F:Z++ −! R is convex if and only if, for all n 2Z ++,
F(n +1 )
1
2
[ F( n )+F( n+2 ) ] : (34)
F is concave if and only if the reverse inequality is satised in (34).9
Given welfarism and same-number anonymity, which ensures that utility vectors mat-
ter but not the identities of the individuals whose levels of well-being they represent, we
use a social-evaluation ordering R dened on the set of utility vectors Ω = [n2Z++Rn.
That is, R  ΩΩ is a reﬂexive, transitive, and complete binary relation. The better-than
relation and the equally-good relation corresponding to R are denoted by P and I.F o r
the formulation of some of our axioms, it is convenient to use the null utility vector u;
which corresponds to the null alternative, and we let Ω; =Ω[fu;g. A utility level of zero
represents neutrality.
All the theorems in this Appendix refer to the ordering R on the set Ω which can,
with information about individual utility levels, be used to order the non-null alternatives
in X. If the null alternative is present, a principle's value function can be extended to
cover it by using its critical level (see Section 2).
The following axioms impose restrictions on same-number comparisons.
Continuity: For all n 2Z ++ and for all v 2R n,t h es e t sf u2R njuRvg and fu 2R nj
vRug are closed.
Strong Pareto: For all n 2Z ++ and for all u;v 2R n,i fu iv ifor all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng
with at least one strict inequality, then uPv.
The standard formulation of strong Pareto encompasses Pareto indierence, which requires
any two alternatives with the same population to be ranked as equally good if each person
is equally well o in both. Pareto indierence does not appear in the above denition
because it is implied by welfarism; any two identical utility vectors must be equally good
because R is reﬂexive. Same-number anonymity implies
Anonymity: For all n 2Z ++, for all u;v 2R n, for all one-to-one mappings :f1;:::;ng− !
f 1 ;:::;ng,i fv i=u  ( i )for all i 2f 1 ;:::;ng,t h e nuIv.
9 (34) is equivalent to the requirement that the `step-sizes' F(n +1 )−F( n ) are nondecreasing in n;
that is, F(n +2 )−F( n+1 )F( n+1 )−F( n ) for all n 2Z ++.
18If R satises continuity, strong Pareto, and anonymity, there exist continuous, in-
creasing, and symmetric representative-utility functions n:R− !Rfor all n 2Z ++,
with n(γ1n)=γfor all γ 2R , such that, for all n 2Z ++ and for all u;v 2R n,
uRv ()  n(u)   n(v ): (35)
See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [2000] for a proof.
Although knowledge of the representative utility functions is not sucient to rank
utilityvectors of dierent dimensions, the only additional information needed is population
size. If R satises the above axioms, there exists a function W:Z++R − ! R, continuous
and increasing in its second argument, that represents it (Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]).
That is, for all n;m 2Z ++, for all u 2R n,a n df o ra l lv2R m,
uRv () W (n;n(u))  W(m;m(v)): (36)
W is unique up to increasing transformations.
7.2. Population Principles
A population principle is same-number utilitarian if, for any population size n 2Z ++,
utility vectors of dimension n are compared on the basis of their total or average utility.
The utilitarian representative-utility functions can be found as follows. For any n 2Z ++
and for all u 2R n, let representative utility be  = n( u ). Then, for any u 2R n, 1 nIu
and, by same-number utilitarianism,
n =
n X
i=1
ui; (37)
which implies
 = n( u )=
1
n
n X
i =1
ui: (38)
Using a similar argument, it is easy to show that representative-utility functions for same-
number generalized utilitarianism are given by
n(u)=( g n) − 1
 
1
n
n X
i =1
gn(ui)
!
(39)
for all n 2Z ++ and u 2R n ,w h e r eg n :R− !Ris continuous and increasing. Without
loss of generality, gn can be can be chosen so that gn(0) = 0. Note that the function gn
can be dierent for dierent population sizes. Most population principles whose same-
number subprinciples are generalized utilitarian have value functions that allow the same
transform g to be used for all n 2Z ++.
19Averagegeneralized utilitarianismcompares average transformed utilitiesto rank util-
ity vectors. The representative-utility functions are same-number generalized utilitarian
and the corresponding value function is dened by
WAGU(n;)=g (  )=
1
n
n X
i =1
g(ui) (40)
for all (n;) 2Z ++ R . 10
Critical-level generalized utilitarianism uses the sum of the dierences between trans-
formed individual utilities and a transformed xed critical level to rank utility vectors.
Again, representative-utilityfunctions are xed-population generalized utilitarian, and the
value functions are given by
WCLGU(n;)=n
 
g (  )−g (  )

=
n X
i =1
 
g(ui) − g()

(41)
for all (n;) 2Z ++ R ,w h e r eis the xed critical level. The classical generalized-
utilitarian family is the subfamily of CLGU with  =0 .
A population principleimpliesthe repugnant conclusion if, for any population size n 2
Z++, any positive utility level , and any utility level " 2R ++, there exists a population
size m>nsuch that an m-person alternative in which every individual experiences utility
level " is ranked as better than an n-person society in which every individual's utility level
is . " is above neutrality but can be arbitrarily close to it. Formally,
Repugnant Conclusion: For all  2R ++, for all n 2Z ++,a n df o ra l l"2R ++,t h e r e
exists m>nsuch that "1mP1n.
7.3. Independence Axioms and their Consequences
The same-number version of independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals re-
quires that, for a xed population size, the relative ranking of two utility vectors is inde-
pendent of the utilities of those individuals whose utility levels are the same in both.
Independence of the Utilities of Unconcerned Individuals: For all n;m 2Z ++,
for all u;v 2R n, for all w;s 2R m,
( u;w)R(v;w) () (u;s)R(v;s): (42)
Together with continuity, strong Pareto, and anonymity, independence of the utilities
of unconcerned individualsimpliesthat the restrictions of R to RnRn mustbe generalized
utilitarian for all n  3. See Debreu [1960] and Fleming [1952]; a proof can be found in
Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [2000].
10 An ordinally equivalent function ^ W is given by ^ W(n;)= .
20Theorem 1: If R satises continuity, strong Pareto, anonymity, and independence of
the utilities of unconcerned individuals, then, for all n  3, there exists a continuous and
increasing function gn:R− !Rwith gn(0) = 0 such that, for all u;v 2R n,
uRv ()
n X
i=1
gn(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn(vi): (43)
An extended version of the above independence axiom applies to dierent-number
comparisons as well.
Extended Independence of the Utilities of Unconcerned Individuals: For all
u;v;w 2 Ω,
(u;w)R(v;w) () uRv: (44)
Expansion equivalence requires the existence of critical levels for all utility vectors
u 2 Ω. Note that the critical levels may be dierent for dierent utility vectors.
Expansion Equivalence: For all u 2 Ω, there exists c 2Rsuch that (u;c)Iu.
The following weakening of this axiom requires the existence of at least one critical
level.
Weak Expansion Equivalence: There exist  u 2 Ωa n d c2Rsuch that ( u;  c)I u.
If R satises strong Pareto and expansion equivalence, all critical levels exist and are
unique. Thus, there exist critical-level functions Cn:Rn −! R for all n 2Z ++ such that,
for all n 2Z ++ and for all u 2R n,( u;Cn(u))Iu.
Weak expansion equivalence and extended independence of the utilities of uncon-
cerned individualstogether imply expansion equivalence and, furthermore, all critical levels
must be the same (see, for example, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [1995, 1998, 2000]).
This observation is useful in proving the following characterization result for critical-level
generalized utilitarianism (see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [1998]).
Theorem 2: R satises continuity, strong Pareto, anonymity, extended independence
of the utilities of unconcerned individuals, and weak expansion equivalence if and only if
there exist a continuous and increasing function g:R− !Rwith g(0) = 0 and  2R
such that, for all n;m 2Z ++, for all u 2R n, for all v 2R m,
uRv ()
n X
i=1
 
g(ui) − g()


m X
i=1
 
g(vi) − g()

: (45)
21The following independence axiom is intermediate in strength between independence
of the utilities of unconcerned individuals and its extended counterpart.
Intermediate Independence of the Utilities of Unconcerned Individuals: For all
u;v 2 Ω;, for all r 2Z ++, for all w;s 2R r,
( u;w)R(v;w) () (u;s)R(v;s): (46)
Analogously, there is an axiom that is intermediate in strength between weak expan-
sion equivalence and expansion equivalence.
Intermediate Expansion Equivalence: For all n 2Z ++,t h e r ee x i s t u2R nand
cn 2Rsuch that ( u;cn)I u.
The value function for number-sensitive critical-level generalized utilitarianism is
given by
W(n;)=ng() − Ag(n) (47)
for all (n;) 2Z ++ R ,w h e r e
= n( u )=g − 1

1
n
n X
i =1
g(ui)

(48)
and Ag:Z++ −! R is a function that depends on the transformation g. Dening the
function  Ag:Z++ −! R as  Ag(n)=g − 1 
A g( n ) =n

for all n 2Z ++, the value function for
NCLGU can be rewritten as
W(n;)=n

g (  )−g
  A g( n )
 
: (49)
The following theorem is a characterization of number-sensitive critical-level general-
ized utilitarianism.
Theorem 3: R satises continuity, strong Pareto, anonymity, intermediate indepen-
dence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals, and intermediate expansion equivalence if
and only if there exist a continuous and increasing function g:R− !Rwith g(0) = 0 and
a function Ag:Z++ −! R such that, for all n;m 2Z ++, for all u 2R n, for all v 2R m,
uRv ()
n X
i=1
g(ui) − Ag(n) 
m X
i=1
g(vi) − Ag(m): (50)
22Proof. That the number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles satisfy
the axioms is straightforward to verify. Now suppose R satises continuity, strong Pareto,
anonymity, intermediate independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals and in-
termediate expansion equivalence. Because intermediate independence of the utilities of
unconcerned individuals implies independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals,
Theorem 1 implies that, for all n  3, there exists a continuous and increasing function
gn:R− !Rwith gn(0) = 0 such that, for all u;v 2R n,
uRv ()
n X
i=1
gn(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn(vi): (51)
Let n 2Z ++. By intermediate expansion equivalence, there exist  u 2R nand cn 2R
such that
( u;cn)I u: (52)
Let r = n and u =( c n ), v = u;, w = u ,a n ds2R nin the denition of intermediate
independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals. By (52) and intermediate inde-
pendence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals, (s;cn)Is and, because s 2R nwas
chosen arbitrarily, cn must be a critical level for any n-dimensional vector.
Next, we prove that, for all n  3, the functions gn and gn+1 c a nb ec h o s e nt ob et h e
same. Let u;v 2R n. Because cn is a critical level for u and v, it follows that
uRv () (u;cn)R(v;cn): (53)
By (51),
uRv ()
n X
i=1
gn(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn(vi) (54)
and
(u;cn)R(v;cn) ()
n X
i=1
gn+1(ui)+g n +1(cn) 
n X
i=1
gn+1(vi)+g n +1(cn)
()
n X
i=1
gn+1(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn+1(vi):
(55)
Therefore, using (53),
n X
i=1
gn(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn(vi) ()
n X
i=1
gn+1(ui) 
n X
i=1
gn+1(vi) (56)
which means that the same function can be used for gn and for gn+1. Because this is true
for all n  3, it follows that the functions gn can be chosen independently of n,a n dw e
23write g = gn for all n  3. Together with (51), it follows that, for all n  3a n df o ra l l
u;v 2R n,
uRv ()
n X
i=1
g(ui) 
n X
i=1
g(vi): (57)
Next, we prove that (57) must be true for n 2f 1 ;2 gas well. Suppose u;v 2R 1.B y
strong Pareto and the increasingness of g,
uRv () u 1  v 1 () g(u 1)  g(v 1): (58)
If n =2a n du;v 2R n, intermediate independence of the utilities of unconcerned individ-
uals and (57) together imply
uRv () (u;c2)R(v;c2) ()
2 X
i=1
g(ui)+g( c 2)
2 X
i =1
g(vi)+g( c 2)
()
n X
i=1
g(ui) 
n X
i=1
g(vi):
(59)
To complete the proof, let n;m 2Z ++ with n 6= m, u 2R n,a n dv2R m. Without
loss of generality, suppose n>m . By denition of the critical levels and letting c0 2Rbe
arbitrary,
uRv () uR(v;cm;:::;c n−1)
()
n X
i=1
g(ui) 
m X
i=1
g(vi)+
n X
i = m +1
g(ci−1)
()
n X
i=1
g(ui) −
n X
i=1
g(ci−1) 
m X
i=1
g(vi) −
m X
i=1
g(ci−1)
(60)
and, dening Ag(n)=
P n
i =1 g(ci−1) for all n 2Z ++, this completes the proof.
c0 is arbitrary when alternatives with positive population sizes only are ranked, but
when NCLU is extended to cover the null alternative, c0 is its critical level. For that
reason, we refer to c0 as a critical level.
7.4. Number-Sensitive Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism
The functions Ag in Theorem 3 can be chosen arbitrarily. Because they determine the
critical levels, with g(cn)=A g( n+1)−A g(n), restrictions on the function Ag are implied
by restrictions on critical levels. The following theorems provide necessary and sucient
conditions on Ag for several ethically attractive restrictions.
Theorem 4: Let R be a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering. All critical levels are nonnegative if and only if Ag is nondecreasing.
24Proof. By denition, Ag(n)=
P n
i =1g(ci−1) for all n 2Z ++. Therefore, for all n 2Z ++,
g(cn)=A g( n+1 )−A g( n ) and hence
cn = g−1[Ag(n +1 )−A g( n )] (61)
for all n 2Z ++ (note that g−1 is well-dened and increasing because g is increasing).
Because g(0) = 0,
cn  0 () g −1[A g(n +1 )−A g( n )]  0
() A g(n +1 )−A g( n )0
() A g(n +1 )A g( n )
(62)
for all n 2Z ++.
If the null alternative is present, nonnegativity of all critical levels also implies that
Ag(n) is nonnegative because Ag(1) = g(c0)  0.
Theorem 5: Let R be a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering. Critical levels are nondecreasing if and only if Ag is convex.
Proof. Using (61) and the increasingness of g−1, it follows that
cn+1  cn () g −1[A g(n +2 )−A g( n+1 ) ]g − 1[ A g( n+1 )−A g( n )]
() A g(n +2 )−A g( n+1 )A g( n+1 )−A g( n )
() A g(n +1 )
1
2
[ A g( n )+A g( n+2 ) ]
(63)
for all n 2Z ++.
Theorem 6: Let R be a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering. R implies the repugnant conclusion if and only there exists an in-
creasing sequence hmjij2Z++ in Z++ such that, for all  2R ++, there exists ~ | 2Z ++ such
that  Ag(mj) <for all j  ~ |.
Proof. `Only if.' Suppose a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering R impliesthe repugnant conclusion, whichmeans that, for all  2R ++,
for all n 2Z ++, for all " 2R ++, there exists m>nsuch that
m
h
g
 
"

− g
   Ag(m)
i
>n
h
g
 


−g
  A g( n )
 i
: (64)
Let h"jij2Z++ be a sequence in R++ such that limj!1 "j =0 .
Let n = 1. By the repugnant conclusion, for all  2R ++, there exists m1 > 1s u c h
that
m1
h
g
 
"1

− g
   Ag(m1)
i
>
h
g
 


− g
   Ag(1)
i
: (65)
25Choosing >c 0=  A g(1), the right side of (65) is positive and, consequently, (65) implies
g
   Ag(m1)

<g ( " 1).
For any j 2Z ++,s e tn=m j. By the repugnant conclusion, there exists mj+1 >m j
such that
mj+1
h
g
 
"j+1

− g
   Ag(mj+1
i
>m j
h
g
 


−g
  A g( m j)
 i
(66)
for all  2R ++.C h o o s i n g >maxfci−1 j i 2f 1 ;:::;m jgg, the right side of (66) is
positive and, consequently, the inequality requires g
   Ag(mj+1)

<g ( " j +1). Therefore, we
have proven that g
   Ag(mj)

<g ( " j) and, because g is increasing,
 Ag(mj) <" j (67)
for all j 2Z ++. Because limj!1 "j = 0, for any  2R ++, there exists ~ | 2Z ++ such that
"j <for all j  ~ |. Hence, using (67),  Ag(mj) <for all j  ~ |.
`If.' Suppose there exists an increasing sequence hmjij2Z++ in Z++ with the properties
stated in the theorem. Let  2R ++, n 2Z ++,a n d"2R ++. Letting  = g("=2), it
follows that there exists ~ | 2Z ++ such that  Ag(mj) <" = 2 and hence g
   Ag(mj)

<g ( "=2)
for all j  ~ |.C h o o s e^ | 2Z ++ so that m^ | >n(this is possible because hmjij2Z++ is an
increasing sequence in Z++ and, thus, unbounded), and let  | =m a x f ^ |;~ |g. By denition,
mj >nand g
   Ag(mj)

<g ( "=2) for all j   | . It follows that
m |
h
g
 
"

−g
   Ag(m | )
i
>m  |
h
g
 
"

−g
 
"=2
i
> 0 (68)
and hence g(")−g
   Ag(m | )

>g ( " )−g ( "=2) > 0. Thus, g(")−g
   Ag(mj)

>g ( " )−g ( "=2)
and hence
mj
h
g
 
"

− g
   Ag(mj)
i
>m j
h
g
 
"

−g
 
"=2
i
> 0 (69)
for all j   | . Because hmjij2Z++ is an increasing sequencein Z++, mj[g(")−g("=2)] −! 1
as j −! 1 and, hence, j can be chosen suciently large so that
mj
h
g
 
"

− g
   Ag(mj)
i
>m j
h
g
 
"

−g
 
"=2
i
>n
h
g
 


−g
  A g( n )
 i
(70)
which is the repugnant conclusion.
If critical levels are nonnegative or nondecreasing, the necessary and sucient con-
dition for NCLGU to imply the repugnant conclusion can be simplied as stated in the
following two theorems. The proofs are similar to the proof of Theorem 6 and are omitted.
Theorem 7: Let R be a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering with nonnegative critical levels. R implies the repugnant conclusion if
and only there exists an increasing sequence hmjij2Z++ in Z++ such that limj!1  Ag(mj)=
0 .
26Theorem 8: Let R be a number-sensitive critical-level generalized-utilitarian social-
evaluation ordering with nondecreasing critical levels. R implies the repugnant conclusion
if and only if all critical levels are nonpositive.
The next theorem examines the behaviour of number-sensitive critical-level general-
ized utilitarianism in choice problems. Given a feasible set of utility vectors U, suppose
we choose the best utility vectors according to number-sensitive critical-level generalized
utilitarianism. We assume that the set of feasible utility vectors U is such that best ele-
ments exist. Let c = hcnin2Z++ be the sequence of critical levels, and let (c)d e n o t et h e
set of chosen utility vectors for the critical levels c.W eo b t a i n
Theorem 9: Let c and c0 be two sequences of critical levels such that there exists r 2Z ++
with c0
r >c r and c0
j = cj for all j 2Z ++ nf r g .L e tn;m 2Z ++, u 2R n,a n dv2R m.I f
u2(c) and v 2 (c0) and (c) 6= ( c 0) , then n>m .
Proof. Suppose u 2 (c)a n dv2(c0). Because the chosen utility vectors are best
elements in U according to number-sensitive critical-level generalized utilitarianism, it
follows that
n X
i=1
g(ui) −
n X
i=1
g(ci−1) 
m X
i=1
g(vi) −
m X
i=1
g(ci−1) (71)
and
m X
i=1
g(vi) −
m X
i=1
g(c0
i−1) 
n X
i=1
g(ui) −
n X
i=1
g(c0
i−1): (72)
Adding these inequalities and rearranging, we obtain
n X
i=1
g(c0
i−1) −
m X
i=1
g(c0
i−1) 
n X
i=1
g(ci−1) −
m X
i=1
g(ci−1): (73)
If r  maxfn;mg or r<minfn;mg, (73) is trivially satised and both u and v are
solutions to both problems, which contradicts the assumption that (c) 6= ( c 0).
Ifminfn;mgr<maxfn;mg, it follows that n 6= m. Because m>nis incompatible
with (73), it follows that we must have n>m .
7.5. Number-Dampened Generalized Utilitarianism
Ng [1986] suggests number-dampened utilitarianism (NDU) as an alternative to critical-
levelutilitarianismin order to avoid therepugnant conclusion(see also Hurka [1983]). NDU
can be made consistent with same-number generalized utilitarianism and we investigate
27number-dampened generalized utilitarianism in this subsection. The value function for
NDGU is given by
W(n;)=f ( n ) g (  )=
f ( n )
n
n X
i =1
g(ui) (74)
for all (n;) 2Z ++R,w h e r ef:Z ++ −! R++, g:R− !Ris continuous and increasing,
g(0) = 0 and
 = n( u )=g − 1

1
n
n X
i =1
g(ui)

: (75)
NDU results from setting g equal to the identity map. For future reference, we dene the
average function  f:Z++ −! R ++ by dening  f(n)=f( n ) =n for all n 2Z ++.
Critical-level functions for NDGU can be computed from the value function. Let c
be the critical level for u 2R n.T h e n
f ( n ) g (  )=f ( n+1 )
ng()+g ( c )
n+1
: (76)
Solving for g(c), we get
g(c)=g
 
C n( u )

=
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
g( ) (77)
or
c = Cn(u)=g − 1

( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
g( )

(78)
Dening
h(n)=
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
; (79)
(77) can be rewritten as
g(c)=g
 
C n( u )

=h ( n ) g (  ) : (80)
If the same-number principles are utilitarian, then
Cn(u)=
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
=h ( n ) : (81)
Number-dampened generalized utilitarianism can be characterized by adding expan-
sion equivalence and a requirement on the structure of the critical-level functions Cn to
the assumption that R is same-number generalized utilitarian.
Theorem 10: Let R be a social-evaluation ordering whose same-number subprinciples
are generalized utilitarian with gn = g for all n 2Z ++. R satises expansion equivalence
and there exists a function h:Z++ −! R with h(n) > −n for all n 2Z ++ such that
g
 
Cn(u)

= h(n)g(n(u)) if and only if R is a number-dampened generalized-utilitarian
social-evaluation ordering.
28Proof. `If.' Suppose R is NDGU. The argument in the text above shows that g
 
Cn(u)

=
h(n)g(n(u)) where h:−! R is given by (79). Because f(n) > 0 for all n 2Z ++,
(n +1 ) f( n )>0
= )( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )>− nf(n +1 )
= )
( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
>− n
= )h ( n )>− n:
(82)
`Only if.' Suppose g
 
Cn(u)

= h(n)g()w i t hh ( n )>− nfor all n 2Z ++ and all
u 2R n ,w h e r e= n ( u ). Again, we construct f explicitly and show that it has the
required properties. Dene the function H:Z++ −! R by letting H(1) = 1 and
H(n)=
h ( n−1)
n − 1
2
4
n−1 X
j=1
H(j)
3
5 (83)
for all n  2. Let w 2Rbe such that uI(w). By denition of H,
(w)Iw(H(1))I:::Iw(H(1);:::;H(n)) (84)
and, therefore, using same-number GU,
uI(w) ()
g(w)
n
[H (1) + :::H(n)] = g()
() w =
ng()
Pn
j=1H(j)
:
(85)
Now dene f(n)=n=
Pn
j=1H(j) for all n 2Z ++. By denition, W(n;)=f ( n ) g (  )f o r
all n 2Z ++ and all  2R . It remains to be shown that f(n) > 0 for all n 2Z ++.W e
proceed by induction. For n =1 ,w eo b t a i nf (1) = 1=H(1) = 1 > 0. Now suppose n  2
and f(m) > 0 for all m 2f 1 ;:::;n−1g. Clearly, f(n) > 0 if and only if
Pn
j=1H(j) > 0.
By denition,
n X
j=1
H(j)=
n − 1 X
j =1
H(j)+H( n )
=
n − 1 X
j=1
H(j)+
h ( n−1)
n − 1
n−1 X
j=1
H(j)
=

1+
h ( n−1)
n − 1
 n−1 X
j=1
H(j):
(86)
Because h(n−1) > −(n−1) by assumption and
Pn−1
j=1 H(j) > 0 by the induction hypoth-
esis, this implies f(n) > 0.
Next, we examine some properties of number-dampened generalized utilitarianism.
29Theorem 11: Let R be an NDGU social-evaluation ordering. All critical levels are
nonnegative if and only if R is classical generalized utilitarian.
Proof. Clearly, CGU implies that all critical levels are zero and hence nonnegative. Con-
versely, nonnegativity of the critical levels according to NDGU requires that h(n)g()  0
for all n 2Z ++ and all  2R . Because  and, hence, g(), may be positive or negative
for all n 2Z ++, this is only possible if h(n) = 0 for all n 2Z ++. By denition of h,t h i s
requires
(n +1 ) f( n )−nf(n + 1) = 0 (87)
or, equivalently,
f(n)
n
=
f(n +1 )
n+1
(88)
which implies that f(n)=an for all n 2Z ++,w h e r ea2R ++ is a constant. The resulting
value function is ordinally equivalent to CGU.
Theorem 12: Let R be an NDGU social-evaluation ordering. The function f is nonde-
creasing if and only if h(n)  1 for all n 2Z ++.
Proof. By denition of h,
h(n)  1 () (n +1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )f( n+1 )
() (n +1 ) f( n )−( n+1 ) f( n+1 )0
() f (n)  f (n +1 )
(89)
for all n 2Z ++.
Theorem 13: Let R be an NDGU social-evaluation ordering. The function h is nonnegative-
valued if and only if  f is nonincreasing.
Proof. By denition of h,
h(n)  0 ()
(n +1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
0
() (n +1 ) f( n )nf(n +1 )
()
f (n)
n

f (n +1 )
n+1
(90)
for all n 2Z ++.
Nonincreasingness of  f implies concavity of f but the reverse implication is not true.
Suppose  f is nonincreasing. This implies
f(n +2 )
n+2

f( n+1 )
n+1

f( n )
n
(91)
30for all n 2Z ++. This implies
f(n +2 )−f( n+1 )
n+2
n+1
f( n+1 )−f( n+1 )=
f( n+1 )
n+1
(92)
and
f(n +1 )−f( n )−
n
n+1
f( n+1 )+f( n+1 )=
f( n+1 )
n+1
(93)
for all n 2Z ++. Combining these inequalities and rearranging, we obtain
f(n +1 )
1
2
[ f( n )+f( n+ 2)] (94)
for all n 2Z ++.
The following example shows that concavity of f is not sucient for nonincreasingness
of  f (and, thus, nonnegative-valuedness of h). Let f(1) = 1 and f(n)=n+1foralln2.
Clearly, f is concave, but we obtain h(1) = −1=3 < 0( a n dh ( n ) = 0 for all n  2).
Theorem 14: Let R be an NDGU social-evaluation ordering. The function h is nonde-
creasing if and only if
(n +2 ) f( n+1 ) f( n+1 )−f( n+1 ) f( n+2 )−( n+1 ) f( n ) f( n+2 )0 (95)
for all n 2Z ++.
Proof. h is nondecreasing if and only if h(n +1 )h ( n ) for all n 2Z ++,a n d
h ( n+1 )h ( n )
()
(n +2 ) f( n+1 )−( n+1 ) f( n+2 )
f( n+2 )

( n+1 ) f( n )−nf(n +1 )
f( n+1 )
() (n +2 ) f( n+1 ) f( n+1 )−f( n+1 ) f( n+2 )−( n+1 ) f( n ) f( n+2 )0 :
(96)
Theorem 15: Let R be an NDGU social-evaluation ordering. R implies the repugnant
conclusion if and only the function f is unbounded.
31Proof. `If.' Suppose f is unbounded. Let  2R ++, n 2Z ++,a n d"2R ++. Because
f is unbounded, there exists m>nsuch that f(m) >f ( n ) g (  ) =g(") which implies the
repugnant conclusion.
`Only if.' Suppose f is bounded by  2R ++,t h a ti s ,f ( n )for all n 2Z ++.L e t
g (  )= ,n=1 ,a n dg ( " )=f (1). The repugnant conclusion requires that there exists
m>n=1s u c ht h a tf( m )>which, by assumption, is ruled out.
It is possible to derive a formula for the function f in terms of h. For any utility
vector u 2 Ω with representative utility  6=0 ,i fg ( c )=h ( n ) g (  ), then
f(n)g()=f ( n+1 )
ng()+h ( n ) g (  )
n+1
: (97)
Dividing both sides by g() and rearranging,
f(n +1 )=

n+1
n+h ( n )

f( n ) (98)
for all n 2Z ++.I ff (1) is normalized to one, then (98) implies that
f(n)=
8
<
:
1i f n =1 , 
2
1+h(1)

:::

n
n−1+h(n−1)

if n  2. (99)
Now consider the special case where the function h is a positive fraction with h(n)=
h γ( n )=γ2(0;1) for all n 2Z ++. Writing fγ as the function f corresponding to hγ,
fγ(n)=
8
<
:
1i f n =1 , 
2
1+γ

:::

n
n−1+γ

if n  2. (100)
Theorem 16 shows that all members of the subfamily of the number-dampened generalized
utilitarian family with f = fγ for some γ 2 (0;1) imply the repugnant conclusion. In
the proof of this result, we use Abel's theorem (Brand [1955, p.52]) which states that
if hanin2Z++ is a positive and decreasing sequence and (a1 + :::+a n)c o n v e r g e s ,t h e n
limn!1 nan =0 :
Theorem 16: If R is an NDGU social-evaluation ordering with f = fγ for some γ 2
(0;1), it implies the repugnant conclusion.
32Proof. Suppose that fγ is bounded. Because fγ is increasing in n, it is bounded if and
only if it converges and, because i=(i − 1+γ)>1 for all i  2, the limit is at least one.
Write fγ as fγ(1) = 1 and, for n  2,
fγ(n)=
n − 1 Y
i =1
i +1
i+γ
: (101)
Then the product
n Y
i=1
i +1
i+γ
(102)
converges to the same limit. Therefore, the logarithm
n X
i=1
ln

i+1
i+γ

(103)
converges as well. The individual terms ln
 
(i+1 )= (i+γ)

are positive and decreasing in
i because γ<1. By Abel's theorem,
lim
n!1
nln

n +1
n+γ

= 0 (104)
and, therefore,
lim
n!1
ln

n +1
n+γ
 n
=0 : (105)
Because ln
 
(n +1 ) = ( n+γ)

converges to zero,
lim
n!1ln

n +1
n+γ
 n
+ lim
n!1ln

n +1
n+γ

= lim
n!1ln

n +1
n+γ
 n +1
=0 ; (106)
which is equivalent to
lim
n!1

n +1
n+γ
 n +1
=1 : (107)
Inverting both sides,
lim
n!1

n + γ
n +1
 n +1
= lim
n!1

1+
γ−1
n+1
 n +1
=1 : (108)
But
lim
n!1

1+
γ−1
n+1
 n +1
= eγ−1; (109)
which is less than one for all γ 2 (0;1) and a contradiction is obtained. Consequently, fγ
is not bounded and, by Theorem 15, R implies the repugnant conclusion.
Finally, we discuss the properties of number-dampened generalized utilitarianism in
choice problems. Again, suppose we choose the best utility vectors from a feasible set
U, this time according to NDGU. Let Ψ(γ) be the set of chosen utility vectors for the
parameter γ 2 (0;1) when f = fγ.
33Theorem 17: Let γ;γ0 2 (0;1) be such that γ0 >γ .L e t n;m 2Z ++, u 2R n ,a n d
v2R m.I fu2Ψ(γ) and v 2 Ψ(γ0) and Ψ(γ) 6=Ψ ( γ 0) , then n>m .
Proof. Suppose u 2 Ψ(γ)a n dv2Ψ(γ0). Because the chosen vectors are best elements
according to number-dampened generalizedutilitarianismwhere h is a fraction, this implies
fγ(n)
n
n X
i=1
g(ui) 
fγ(m)
m
m X
i=1
g(vi) (110)
and
fγ0(m)
m
m X
i=1
g(vi) 
fγ0(n)
n
n X
i=1
g(ui): (111)
This implies that
Pn
i=1 g(ui)a n d
P m
i =1g(vi) must have the same sign. Multiplying (110)
and (111) and simplifying yields
fγ(n)fγ0(m)  fγ(m)fγ0(n); (112)
which implies
fγ0(m)
fγ0(n)

fγ(m)
fγ(n)
: (113)
If n = m it follows that Ψ(γ)=Ψ ( γ 0 ), contradicting our assumption. If n<m , (112)
implies 
n +1
n+γ 0

:::

m
m−1+γ 0



n+1
n+γ

:::

m
m−1+γ

; (114)
which is a contradiction to γ0 >γ . Therefore, we must have n>m .
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